DESIGNING FOOD SAFETY REGULATIONS: THE EFFECT OF INSPECTION POLICY AND PENALTIES FOR NONCOMPLIANCE ON FOOD PROCESSOR BEHAVIOR by Starbird, S. Andrew
Journal  ofAgricultural and Resource Economics 25(2):616-635
Copyright 2000 Western Agricultural  Economics Association
Designing Food Safety Regulations:
The Effect of Inspection Policy  and
Penalties for Noncompliance  on
Food Processor Behavior
S. Andrew Starbird
In the United States, federal,  state, and local governments are involved with the
regulation of the safety of  the food supply. Food safety regulations that set standards
for food  processors usually include inspection policies for monitoring performance
and penalties for processors who do not comply with regulatory standards. In this
analysis,  we  examine how penalties  and inspection  policies interact  to influence
processor behavior. We distinguish between internal penalties (imposed by the regu-
lator) and external penalties (imposed by the market or by the court). Using a model
of the processor's expected annual cost, we find that under a given inspection policy
internal penalties  are only relevant under  specific conditions.  For cases  in which
internal and external penalties can be influenced, we use comparative statics to dis-
cover that internal penalties are more economically efficient for motivating processors
than external penalties. These results imply that regulators should utilize internal
penalties for noncompliance rather than rely on market- or court-imposed penalties.
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Introduction
Recent outbreaks of diseases caused by foodborne pathogens (e.g., Campylobacter,  Lis-
teria,  Salmonella,  E. coli 0157:H7) have raised consumer concerns about food safety and
forced the government  to take  action on a number of food safety  fronts. In the last
decade,  state and federal legislatures have passed dozens of laws related  to the safe
production, processing, distribution, and preparation of food. Recent examples include
the 1998 California law requiring that every food service establishment have an employee
who is food safety "certified," and the 1996 U.S. Pathogen Reduction/Hazard  Analysis
and  Critical  Control  Point Systems  (PR/HACCP)  Act  which  establishes  inspection
policies and performance standards for meat and poultry processors [U.S. Department
of Agriculture  (USDA)]. The objective of such legislation is to improve the safety of the
food supply by requiring that food companies adopt methods for controlling the spread
of biological, physical, and chemical  contaminants.
The government's interest in food safety is not new, of course. Since the Pure Food and
Drugs Act of 1906, the U.S. government has passed dozens of laws which have estab-
lished hundreds of regulations related to food safety (Middlekauf). Antle defines three
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categories  of food safety regulations:  (a) regulations that address food safety through
consumer information such as nutrition labeling and safe food handling and preparation
information, (b) regulations that address food safety though process design standards
such as federally mandated good manufacturing practices (GMPs) and HACCP imple-
mentation requirements, and (c) regulations that address food safety through performance
standards, like the well-known "Delaney Clause" of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FFDCA). In this study, we focus on regulations which address food safety through
the use of performance standards and examine how the design of these regulations can
influence a food company's motivation to comply with performance standards.
Statutory food safety performance standards, in and of themselves, do not guarantee
food processors will deliver safe food. In order to be effective, regulations designed to
address food safety through performance standards must include: (a) a quantifiable and
measurable performance  standard for the presence  of contaminants,  (b) a reliable
inspection procedure for monitoring compliance to the performance standard, and (c) an
economic penalty for failure to comply with the performance standard.
The 1996 PR/HACCP provides examples of the first two requisite elements. Under the
PR/HACCP, the Food Safety and Inspection  Service (FSIS) of the USDA establishes
threshold levels for the incidence of E. coli in slaughtered beef, broilers, and hogs. For
example, according to the Act, beef carcasses must have no more that 100 colony-forming
units per square centimeter (cfu/cm2) ofE. coli as measured by standard laboratory tests
(a quantifiable and measurable standard). To enforce this standard, the PR/HACCP
requires that processors use a three-class attributes sampling plan with a specific
number of samples taken at a specific frequency (a reliable inspection procedure).
Although the PR/HACCP does not have a government-imposed economic penalty written
into the legislation, there are, of course, very real court- and market-imposed economic
penalties associated with shipping unsafe food products.
Few question the importance of accurate inspection procedures  and meaningful
economic penalties in the design of food safety regulations. However, the impacts of these
design elements on the processor's willingness to comply with performance standards
have not been explored to any great extent. Hundreds (and perhaps thousands) of alter-
native inspection policies could be written into the legislation. Food safety regulators
need to know whether or not some inspection policies motivate the processor more than
others. Similarly, while regulations like PR/HACCP rely on external economic penalties,
there are many ways an internal economic penalty could be imposed. Food safety regula-
tors need to know whether or not large but uncertain external penalties are motivation
enough, and what is the lowest economic penalty that will motivate the processor to
achieve the statute's standards. Finally, regulators need to know how different types
of penalties interact to influence  processor behavior. The  effectiveness  of food safety
legislation  based on performance  standards depends  on how inspection  policies and
economic penalties interact to influence processor behavior.
In this analysis,  we  explore  how the  design  of food safety  regulations influences
processor behavior by building inspection policy and economic penalty into the expected
cost function of a food processor. Specifically, we want to identify the minimum economic
penalty that will motivate a processor to achieve the statutory standards for food safety
under a given inspection policy. This information is important to regulatory agencies
charged with designing regulations to meet legislative objectives, and it is important to
processors  who need  to understand the trade-offs between delivering  safer food  and
incurring economic penalties.
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Literature Review
Three separate research tracks have emerged which have a bearing on the work presented
here. The first of these addresses the costs and benefits of the regulation of food processors
(Roberts, Buzby, and Ollinger; Unnevehr; MacDonald and Crutchfield; Caswell and
Kleinshmit). This cost-benefit research attempts to measure the cost to food processors
of implementing food safety regulations and compare it to the benefits of food safety in
terms of the reduced societal costs of consumer mortality and morbidity. One of the most
difficult aspects of this research is measuring and predicting the economic value of the
lives lost due to food safety lapses. A number of researchers have approached  the
problem by using sophisticated risk assessment techniques to measure the probability
that a consumer  will  contract a disease  as a function  of the presence  of biological,
physical, or chemical contaminants in the food supply (Vose; Lammerding; Marks et al.).
Such information is essential in establishing meaningful and appropriate performance
standards for government regulation.
Another research track relevant to this study is the economic comparison of inter-
nal (ex ante) and external (ex post) costs for the purposes of designing regulations.
The primary reference for this type of research is the work done by Kolstad, Ulen,
and  Johnson  (see  also the  comment  by Ewerhart  and  Schmitz).  These  authors
characterize  the  differences  between  internal  and  external  costs  and  evaluate
their complementarity  or substitutability in achieving socially optimal control of
safety-related externalities.  Klein and Leffler address this issue by examining the
relationship between reputation for quality and safety, consumer response to this
reputation,  and a company's motivation to deliver high-quality,  safe products.  In
general, these studies focus on the market-level effects of safety regulation without
delving into the firm-level behavior.
The third and final research  track related to this study is the work on supply
chain  contracts.  From the point of view of a food processor,  a regulation  with  a
performance  standard is very similar to a supply contract with product specifica-
tions. Models developed to measure the effect of contractual provisions associated
with quality on  supplier behavior  are closely related  to the model of food  safety
presented here (e.g., Reyniers and Tapiero; Starbird). Tsay, Nahmias, and Agrawal
provide  a thorough  review of the  work on  supply chain contracts,  including  the
quality dimension.
This research contributes to the literature by applying some of the recent advances
in our understanding  of supply chain  contract  design  to the design  of government
regulations addressing food safety. Research has already shown that in the contractual
relationship between the supplier and its customers, inspection policies and the cost of
quality can influence the behavior of suppliers. These results imply that government
regulations which establish inspection policies and penalties for noncompliance  influ-
ence  the behavior  of food processors  as  well.  This  research  also contributes  to the
literature  by introducing quality as a decision variable over which the processor has
some level of control.  In most economic studies, quality is assumed to be an unknown
or unobservable exogenous variable. In this study, we assume the processor has control
over the quality variable and selects the economically optimal quality level in the context
of exogenous governmental regulations.
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The Model
The model is a mathematical representation of the expected cost per year of a food
processor facing statutory food safety performance standards which are enforced by
means of product inspection. We assume the processor's finished good is inspected at the
end of the production  process and we limit our attention to sampling inspection,  as
opposed to 100% inspection, for reasons described below. Under sampling inspection, a
random sample of size n is drawn from every L unit (the lot size). All L units in the lot
are accepted if the sample is deemed "safe." If the sample is deemed "unsafe," then all
L units in the lot are subject to failure costs which may include penalties imposed by the
regulatory agency.  We assume "unsafe" lots cannot be used to satisfy demand in the
primary market although they may have a secondary market value, i.e., a salvage value
that reduces the cost of failing inspection.
The proportion of the processor's finished goods conforming to statutory food safety
requirements is a decision variable, (. We assume every "safe" unit has the same chance
of being selected for the sample, so 4(  is also the probability that a randomly drawn unit
is  "safe." An alternative  method for representing food safety is to employ a random
variable  that directly  measures  the  incidence  of biological,  chemical,  and  physical
hazards like the density of colony-forming units (cfu) used in the PR/HACCP. We use
4 instead of a measure like cfu/cm2 because, with current inspection technology, it is
difficult to collect information  about the presence  of pathogens at very low levels  of
contamination. We would need this type of information in order to define the probability
density function of a variable like cfu/cm2. Information about the proportion conforming/
not conforming to safety standards is easier to measure because nonconformance occurs
at high, and therefore easy-to-measure,  levels of contamination. We can think of  ) as
the  complementary  cumulative  distribution  of the probability  density function  of a
random variable like cfu/cm2. This definition of "quality" is consistent with the defin-
itions used by researchers in management science (Tagaras and Lee; Starbird) and by
researchers  measuring food safety risk (Vose; Lammerding).
It is important to note that the safety of a food product is influenced by factors outside
the control of the food processor as well. For example, the safety of many food products
is affected by the food handling practices of consumers and food service operations. The
goal of regulators is to motivate the processor to control as much variability in quality
(as measured by food safety)  as possible.  In this study, we do not assume that a food
product which satisfies the regulator's standard is perfectly safe. The definition of what
is "safe" is a medical issue beyond the scope  of this investigation.
When sampling is used to inspect the processor's finished goods, the probability that
a lot is accepted is a function of the sampling plan and the probability  4).  Few,  if any,
food processors use 100% inspection to evaluate the quality of their products due to the
enormous expense  of testing every unit of production.  Sampling inspection  like the
three-class attributes sampling plan specified in the PR/HACCP legislation is the more
common inspection policy for monitoring food safety. One of the important disadvan-
tages of sampling inspection is that nonconforming units can slip past the inspection
procedure. Some sampling plans have high levels of consumer risk (i.e., the risk of
nonconforming product passing inspection), and some have high levels of producer risk
(i.e., the risk of conforming product failing inspection).
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The relationship between 4)  and the probability of lot acceptance, Pa(()), is well docu-
mented  in the quality control  literature (see,  e.g., Montgomery,  pp. 558-59).  In this
model, we restrict our attention to a single-stage, two-class sampling plan in which lots
are accepted or rejected based on the characteristics of a randomly drawn sample. For
this type of sampling plan, if  we assume () is the same for every unit drawn from the lot,
the probability  that a lot is found to be acceptable  is a  simple cumulative binomial
probability:
(1)  Pa((  )  ()1  - (  )dn-d,
d=-0 d
where d is the number of nonconforming units found in a random sample of size n,  ) is
the probability that an inspected unit of production  conforms to the food safety perfor-
mance standard, and c is the acceptable number of nonconforming  units in a lot. The
parameters of the inspection policy (L, n, and c) are often established by the food safety
regulations governing the processor.
Quality Costs Under  Food Safety Regulation
Under the inspection procedures  outlined above, the processor's relevant costs are the
cost of preventing nonconforming product from being made in the first place, the cost
of  inspecting the product in order to detect nonconforming units, the cost associated with
rectifying or scrapping nonconforming product before it is shipped, and the cost of acci-
dently shipping nonconforming product. These categories correspond to Juran's definitions
of prevention costs, appraisal  costs, internal failure  costs, and external failure  costs,
respectively  (Juran and Gryna).
It is important to distinguish between the cost of rectifying or scrapping noncon-
forming product before it is shipped and the cost of accidently shipping nonconforming
product.  The first cost is an "internal penalty" and is the sum of repair, replacement,
and rectification costs plus any penalties that are imposed by the regulatory agency or
customer. The second cost is an "external penalty" and is the sum of court- and/or market-
imposed penalties associated with product liability claims. In the semantics of Kolstad,
Ulen, and Johnson, internal penalties are one component of a number of ex ante costs
faced by a firm, and external penalties are a component  of ex post costs. Legislative
attempts to limit awards made in civil suits are attempts to limit the size of external
penalties.
In this model, we define the prevention cost w(4)  as the cost of achieving a particular
level of conformance. Food processors employ many methods for enhancing the quality
and safety of their final product. In meat and poultry processing, processors can use steam
vacuuming or pasteurization, dehiding, and irradiation to reduce the incidence of food-
borne  pathogens  and improve  safety.  Fruit and vegetable  packers can use multiple
sorting lines, metal detectors, and electronic eyes to locate physical hazards.  Chemical
hazards  can be reduced by increased testing of work in process,  raw materials,  and
ingredients. All of these methods require inputs of some type, and therefore contribute
to the cost of prevention in a food processing plant. At the farm level, Lichtenberg and
Zilberman label such inputs "damage control inputs." For purposes of this analysis, we
assume the prevention cost function is continuous and increasing in  ).
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Several other assumptions are necessary before we develop the processor's expected
cost function.  First, we have  assumed  the  processor faces  only one  performance
standard. This standard may be for a single biological, chemical, or physical hazard, or
may be a combined  standard for more than one hazard. Second,  we assume that any
conforming units found in the sample of a rejected lot are also rejected. This assumption
simplifies the calculation  of the penalty  associated with rejected  lots, and since the
sample size is usually small relative to the lot size, the effect on the results is small.
Third, we assume the processor uses a point estimate of annual demand,  A,  for the
purposes of production planning, establishing operational policies, and calculating
expected costs.
Using (1), we can define the expected annual cost of a food safety regulation to a food
processor as follows:
(2)  Z())  - w()X  +  pnX  + s(l - P(())  + r(1 - ()(L  - n)X
Pa()  Pa(O)L  Pa()  L
where w(4) is the prevention cost of making a unit with a probability of conformance
equal to 4 (w' > 0, w"  2 0), p is the inspection cost for each unit in the sample of size n,
L is the lot size (L > n), X  is the annual market demand, s is the penalty cost associated
with a lot failing the inspection procedure  ($ per unit), and r is the expected cost of
accidently shipping a nonconforming unit in a lot that is accepted ($ per unit). The first
term in (2) is the expected annual cost of prevention and is derived by multiplying the
prevention cost per unit, w(4),  by the number of units produced  each year to satisfy
expected market demand (X/Pa(()). Since some lots are rejected, the processor must plan
to produce an amount larger than annual demand in order to satisfy annual demand,
so the number of units produced each year is represented by A/Pa(()), and the number of
lots produced each year is represented by X/Pa(4))L.
The second term in (2) is the expected annual cost of inspection and is the product of
the number of lots produced and inspected each year (tPa(())L),  the number of units
inspected per lot (n), and the appraisal cost per unit inspected (p). The third term is the
expected annual penalty cost of units which fail inspection and is the product of the
internal penalty cost per unit (s), the number of units in a rejected lot (L), the proba-
bility a lot is rejected (1  - Pa(()), and the number of lots produced each year (/Pa(())L).
Finally, the fourth term in (2) is the expected annual cost of nonconforming units that
reach the market in accepted lots. This quantity is the product of the external penalty
cost per unit (r), the probability that a lot is accepted Pa(4), the expected number of
"unsafe" units in the remainder of the lot ((1 - j)(L - n)), and the expected number of lots
produced each year X/Pa(4)L.
The designers of food safety regulations have direct control over many of the param-
eters in the processor's expected  annual cost function.  Food safety regulations  often
establish  sample  sizes  and acceptance  numbers, which influence  the function Pa(4).
Regulations may also establish a penalty cost (a component  of s),  which adds  to the
annual cost of units that fail inspection, and regulations may control the inspection cost
p by limiting the set of approved inspection procedures. In response to these parameters,
the processor selects the conformance rate  ), which affects the cost of prevention w(4),
the probability of lot acceptance Pa((), and ultimately the average annual cost.
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Conditions  for Cost Minimization
The first-order condition for the minimization of (2) with respect to  ) is
(3)  Z'  - w  '_ 
a pnXPa  _  XP
a r(L - n)  O0
Pa  P2 LPa2 P 2 L
where Pa =  Pa(()), Pa =  aPa(())/a,  w  = w(), and w' =  dw())/8a). The second-order condition
for a value of  ) that minimizes (2) is
(4)  Z  w"  2wP  (  KPa  n  p
Pa  Pa 2 L  )  3 p2)
where Pa' =  2Pa(())/a 2, and w" = a2w(4)/a42. We can gain some insight into whether or
not a minimum exists by substituting (3) into (4) to obtain the following sufficient condi-
tion for an interior minimum:
()w"  WP  r(L-n)P  2 (5)  W  wPca  + r(L  - n)  Pa  2P  >
Pa  PaPa  L  P  Pa
This condition implies that if PI =  0, and w" <  0, then condition (5) cannot hold, no inter-
ior minimum exists, and we would expect a corner solution. These values of Pa/ and w"
are consistent with 100% inspection (because Pa(()  = ()  and a prevention cost function
which is linear in  ). There is no guarantee that (5)  will be true for more complex
functions, although  we can easily test the condition for a given inspection policy and
prevention cost function.
We can also gain insight into the processor's marginal costs by rearranging (3) to get
P'  Par(L-n) (6)  .HS  . ^ (6)  w'  = Pa (w  + pn  +s  + Par( L - n )
Pa  L  L
The left-hand side (LHS) of (6) is the marginal cost of increasing the conformance rate,
which is the marginal  cost of prevention.  The right-hand  side (RHS) of (6) is the
marginal benefit (in this case, reduced cost) of increasing the conformance rate. The first
term on the RHS is the savings from the reduced penalty and from the reduced average
cost per unit. An obvious benefit of increasing the conformance  rate is that fewer lots
are rejected, and so fewer units are subject to a penalty. A less obvious benefit of increas-
ing the conformance rate is that fewer units have to be produced each year to satisfy the
market demand X,  and so the average manufacturing,  inspection, and prevention cost
per unit per year declines. The second term on the RHS is the marginal reduction in the
cost of nonconforming units which pass inspection. As the conformance  rate increases,
the probability of an unsafe product being sent to market in a lot that passes inspection
declines.
The Regulator's  Food Safety Objective
The regulator's objective is to motivate the processor to achieve a target conformance
rate to food safety performance standards,  f,,  where 0 <  )t <  1. While one is tempted to
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assume that (t  = 1 (i.e., the target is 100% conformance  to food safety performance
standards), there are cases where 4( < 1. For example, in the 1996 PR/HACCP Act, the
target conformance rate is significantly less than 1. According to the Act, "[S]laughter
establishments that are operating at the acceptable performance  level ...  [will have]
an 80% probability  ...  [of]  3 or fewer results above m  ...  within every  13 samples
tested ...  ," where m is the cutoff for acceptable product (USDA, p. 38840). Substituting
these values into (1) and solving for (), we find the "acceptable performance level" for the
probability that a unit conforms to the standard m is about 82%.
The first- and second-order conditions derived above can be used to explore how the
design  of food safety regulations  may affect the processor's motivation  to achieve the
regulator's target. First, we can determine the level of penalty cost needed to induce a
processor to achieve the regulator's target. Second, we can determine how the inspection
policy influences the processor's motivation to achieve the regulator's target. Finally, if
the regulator has control over both the internal penalty (s) and the external penalty (r),
we can determine which type of penalty is more efficient is  mon  motivating the processor to
achieve the regulator's objective.
Results
In this section, we use the first-order conditions for the minimization of expected annual
cost  to examine  the  effect  of penalty  cost  and  inspection  cost  on  the  processor's
motivation to achieve the regulator's food safety objective under specific inspection
policies. As we have already seen, the relationship between the penalty costs and the
regulator's food safety objective,  ),, depends upon the inspection policy represented by
Pa(())  and upon the prevention cost function, w()). We present results for two versions
of the single-sample, two-class sampling plan: sampling inspection with an acceptance
number of zero, and sampling inspection with an acceptance number greater than zero.
These two functions behave very differently as the conformance rate approaches 100%
(illustrated in figure 1). We ignore the case of 100% inspection because it is uncommon
in food processing,  and because under 100% inspection all nonconforming product can
be  extracted from the processing line-making achievement  of the regulator's  target
conformance rate a trivial objective.
For each inspection policy,  we consider two different prevention cost functions:
a linear function,  w(4)  = a  + b4),  and an exponential function,  w(4)  = a exp(p(j). We
ignore the case in which  the prevention  cost function  asymptotically  approaches
100% conformance,  which is the same as the assumption that the cost of 100% con-
formance is infinite (see Cheng for an example).  It  seems unlikely that legislation
subject to industry lobbying efforts would establish a performance  standard which
is infeasible at a finite cost; consequently, for purposes of this analysis, we ignore
that possibility.
In the following  subsections,  we first present  four propositions  that identify the
conditions under which the internal penalty cost is relevant in the processor's decision
making. We then examine the case in which the internal penalty is relevant  and the
regulator has  some control  over the external penalty  to ascertain how internal  and
external penalties  can be combined to influence processor behavior.







Conformance  Rate (4)
Figure 1.  The relationship between conformance rate and P.
for three different inspection policies
Conditions Under Which the Internal  Penalty
Influences Processor  Behavior
If the regulator's objective is to motivate the processor to achieve a conformance rate of
4t, then our goal is to find the internal penalty cost, such that 4)*  2 X,  where 4(*  is the
processor's optimal conformance rate, or, equivalently, Z'  < 0 at  t,. If Z' < 0 at ft,  then
the processor's optimal conformance rate ()*  is at least as great as the regulator's target
conformance rate  ft.  By simplifying and rearranging (3), we find that Z'  < 0 at 4t if and
only if
Irpn  (Pa(L-n)J (7)  Paw  P_  r  _'  (_  - n)  <S.
vd  L  PaL a
If (7) holds as an inequality at 4t, then the second-order condition is irrelevant because
we know that levels of conformance greater than 4t will have a lower expected annual
cost than 4(.  If (7) holds as an equality at f,,  then the second-order  condition (4) must
also hold for us to conclude that 4*  =  t,.  To simplify the analysis of condition (7), we
derive  the values of Pa  ,  P  Psa,  w, WI,  and w"  for the  two inspection  policies  and two
prevention cost functions and provide them in the appendix.
Our results are presented in the form of four propositions, as follows.
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*PROPOSITION  1. When government regulations  require  the use of sampling  inspec-
tion with c = 0 to monitor the safety ofa processed  food product  and the processor
faces a linear  prevention cost function {w(d4)  = a + b4}, the processor's optimal
conformance rate is 100%, and therefore at least as great  as the regulator's  target
conformance rate.
Proof. Substituting the values for this case from the appendix into (7)  and
simplifying yields
. .... i ~,Pt(L - n)_<8. (8)  - - a  - P￿  - r  - <  S.
n  L  nL
Condition (8) is always true because the RHS is always positive and, since n  1,
the LHS is always negative. Therefore,  under a linear prevention cost function
and sampling inspection with c = 0, the processor's optimal conformance rate is
always  100%, even when there are no penalty costs.  D
*  PROPOSITION 2. When government  regulations  require  the use of sampling  inspec-
tion with c = 0 to monitor  the safety of  a processed  food product and the processor
faces an exponential  prevention cost function {w((4) = a exp(p))}, the processor's
optimal conformance rate  is greater  than the regulator's  target  conformance rate
if
(9)  w(  - _)  _-  pn  r (tPa(  n)<  s.
n  L  nL
If  the regulator's  target  conformance rate is 100%, then (*  = 100% if and only if
~(10)  ..  . 1  pn  r(  <  - (10)  Jl-ll-P  - ^-  < S.
n  L  nL  )
If  these equations hold as an equality, then condition (5) must also hold.
Proof.  Substituting the values from the appendix into (7) and simplifying yields
(9). When (*  =  t = 100%,  (9) simplifies to (10).  D
If 4t < n/p, then condition (9) is true regardless of the value of s because the LHS is
negative  and the processor's optimal conformance  rate will be 100%.  In other words,
when n is large and P is small, the inspection policy is "rigorous" (i.e., more accurately
measures quality)  and the marginal prevention  cost is low, so the processor is likely
to seek 100%  conformance  regardless of the penalty costs and regulatory standards.
If 4t > n/p, then the opposite is true: The inspection policy is relatively "lax" (less accur-
ately measures quality) because the sample size is small, and the marginal prevention
cost is relatively high because P is large. Under these conditions, the cost of achieving
(t  is high, and an internal penalty cost will have to be imposed in order to motivate the
processor to achieve the regulator's target.
*  PROPOSITION 3. When government regulations  require  the use of sampling inspec-
tion with c > 0 to monitor  the safety of  a processed  food product and the  processor
faces a linear  prevention cost function {w(4) = a + b(}, the processor's  optimal
conformance rate is greater  than the regulator's  target  conformance rate if
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(11)  b(Pat4  tJ  L  (  8.
~(12)  b  ￿~~<.  ~  r(L  - n)
L
If these equations hold as an equality, then condition (5) must also hold.
Proof.  Substituting the values for w and w' from the appendix and rearranging
condition (7) yields (11). If the target conformance  rate is (t = 1, then condition
(11) can be rearranged to eliminate undefined ratios and simplified to yield (12)
because 
4 t  =  Pa = 1,  and Pa =  0 under this inspection policy.  D
Conditions (11) and (12) reveal that the internal penalty cost has no effect on the pro-
cessor's decision if  ,t  > Pa  IPa, or  -t  = 100%. The first condition,  4t > Pa  /Pa, is true when
the marginal improvement in the probability of acceptance,  Pa, is relatively large, and
so the processor is motivated to make improvements in the conformance rate beyond the
regulator's target regardless of the value of s. On the other hand, if 4t =  100%, then
Pa =  0 at ~t,  and the marginal benefit (in terms of internal penalty) of improving the
conformance rate goes to zero as the processor  approaches the target; so the internal
penalty cost has no effect on the processor's  motivation to achieve  (t.
*PROPOSITION  4. When government  regulations  require  the use of sampling  inspec-
tion with c > 0 to monitor  the safety of a  processed  food product  and the processor
faces an exponential  prevention cost function {w(()  = a  exp(())}, the processor's
optimal conformance rate  is  greater  than the regulator's  target  conformance rate
if
(13)  ..  s
Pa'  L  PaL
If the regulator's  target  conformance rate is 100%o, then the condition  for achieving
the regulator's  target is
(14)  pw  < r(L-n)
L
If these equations hold as an equality, then the second-order  condition (4) must
also hold.
Proof.  Substituting the values for w and w' from the appendix and rearranging
condition (7) yields (13). For  It = 1, condition (13) can be rearranged and simpli-
fied to yield (14).  D
Condition (13) indicates that the internal penalty cost is irrelevant to the processor's
decision making if 't  =  100%, or if  PPa  /Pa < 1. If the target conformance is 100%, then
the processor's motivation to achieve the regulator's target is independent of the penalty
cost because marginal savings from reduced penalty disappear as the conformance rate
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Table 1.  Conditions Under Which Internal Failure Cost Influences the Opti-
mal Conformance Rate
Prevention  Conditions Under Which s
Inspection Policy  Cost Function  Influences  Processor Behavior
Sampling with c = 0  Linear  Never
Exponential  (t  > n/P
Sampling with c > 0  Linear  <
Exponential  <
approaches  1.0 under this inspection  policy.  The second condition,  PP,/Pl  < 1, occurs
when Pa is relatively large, implying that the marginal improvement in the probability
of acceptance will make increases in the conformance  rate attractive to the processor
regardless of the value of s.
Propositions 1-4 indicate there are several conditions under which the internal penalty
cost is relevant to the processor's decisions and several conditions under which the inter-
nal penalty cost is irrelevant. The internal failure cost is irrelevant when the prevention
cost function is linear and the product is inspected using sampling inspection with c = 0
(Proposition 1) because the processor's optimal conformance rate is 100%, regardless of
the penalty cost. The internal failure cost is relevant when the prevention cost function
is exponential, sampling inspection with c = 0 is used, and 4:  > nlp (Proposition 2). The
internal failure cost is irrelevant when the prevention cost function is exponential,
sampling inspection with c = 0 is used, and  pt < n/P because the processor's optimal con-
formance rate will be 100% regardless of the value of s under these conditions. Finally,
the internal failure cost is relevant when sampling inspection with c > 0 is used and the
target conformance rate is less than 100% (Propositions 3 and 4) because, if the target
conformance rate is 100%, then the marginal impact on annual cost of s goes to zero as
the processor's conformance rate approaches 100%, and the firm will never achieve this
objective regardless of the value of s. These results are summarized in table 1.
The Interaction  of Internal and External  Penalties
In some cases, it may be possible for regulators to control or influence the external
penalty as well as the internal penalty borne by food processors for food safety lapses.
An example of legislation designed to control  external penalties for quality lapses is
New York City's laws regarding the marketing of underweight food products. Manufac-
turers whose product is below labeled weight face considerable  penalties imposed by
New York's Department of Consumer Affairs. When both s and r can be controlled, the
regulator must decide whether to impose one or the other penalty, or both, and decide
upon the size of the penalty.  Is there a difference in how these penalties influence
processor behavior?
We can answer this question by using comparative statics to examine the way in which
the optimal expected annual cost, Z*, changes with respect to a change in the external
and internal failure costs. If we assume the regulator sets s to the exact minimum
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required to motivate the processor to achieve the target conformance  rate, 4t, then (7)
holds as an equality. Substituting the LHS of (7) into our expected annual cost function
(2) and simplifying yields
(15)  PZ*-w  pn  +  r(L - n)L  (1  - Pa)Pa
p~  Pg  L  L
Pa  P  LP
Taking the derivative of (15) with respect to the external failure cost r  gives
(16) 
az *  _  (L -n)  (  (1  - Pa)P
Or  L  P
Equation (16) represents the marginal change in the optimal annual cost as a result of
a change in the external penalty  cost assuming the conformance  rate is an internal
optimum.  The marginal total cost increases with the probability that a nonconforming
unit is produced (1  - (), and decreases with the ratio (1  - Pa)Pa  IPa, which represents the
reduction  in cost resulting from the increase  in the optimal conformance  rate.  This
marginal cost is positive if and only if 1  - 4 > (1  - P)Pa  IPa.
We can perform a similar calculation for s by assuming (7) is an equality and solving
for r(L -n)/L:
L  Pa  P2  L ~(17)  r(L  n)  =  w  _  ~Pa  w  +  pn  +
Substituting this value into (2) yields
(18)  Z*  w.  + pn  s(1  Pa)
Pa  PaL  Pa
[w  Pa (w  pn  si.(1-4))Pa
+ )L  -^}  - +sX(1  - P
+(-  2  (  L  2|Pa Pa  P[  La
and the derivative  of Z* with respect to s is, of course,
az(* _ x [-  (1-4)PV
(19)  - -Pa  I
Os  Pa  a Pa
Equation (19) represents the marginal change in the optimal annual cost as a result of
a change in the internal penalty cost assuming the conformance rate is an internal
optimum. The marginal total cost increases with the ratio (1  - Pa)/Pa  which represents
the  increase  in the  annual  internal  penalty  cost,  and decreases  with  the  ratio
(1 - 4))Pa'Pa which represents the decrease in annual cost that is a result of increasing
the optimal conformance  rate in response to an increase in the internal penalty  cost.
This marginal cost is positive if and only if (1  - 4)Pa'IPa  < (1  - Pa) or, equivalently, 1  - (
<(1  - Pa)Pa/P.
These results lead us to our final proposition:
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*PROPOSITION  5. If sampling inspection  with c = O,  c =1, or  c = 2 is used to evaluate
quality, the processor will achieve 4t at the lowest expected annual cost if r = 0
and s is set at the minimum defined by equation (7).
Proof Substituting the values  of Pa  and Pa from  the appendix  into  1-  )-
(1  - Pa)Pa/Pa  indicates that for all values of 0 < (  < 1, this quantity is positive.
When this quantity is positive, aZ*/Or > 0 at all values ofr. Therefore, Z* will be
at a minimum value when r = 0.  O
Proposition  5 implies that the most economically efficient means of motivating a
processor to achieve the regulator's target conformance  rate is through the use  of
internal rather than external penalties. Of course, there are many combinations  of
internal and external penalties which will motivate the processor to achieve the target
conformance rate, but all will have a higher expected annual cost than r = 0 and s set
at the minimum defined by (7). Naturally, this result is only valid when s is relevant to
processor decision making as described in the preceding section, and when the optimal
conformance rate is an internal optimum. This result leads to the somewhat provocative
conclusion that the most economically  efficient strategy for motivating a processor to
achieve the regulatory target is to protect the processor from external penalties and
impose internal penalties at the minimum defined by (7).
The reason internal penalties are more economically efficient than external penalties
is related to the difference between the probability that the firm will face an internal
penalty (1  - Pa(4)), and the probability that the firm will face an external penalty (1  - ).
When c = 0, Pa(4)  is always less than (), and so 1 - Pa(4)  is always more than 1 - (.  When
c > 0, Pa(4)  is less than ( unless (  is very close to one, and so 1 - Pa(¢)  is more than 1 - 4
unless  (  is very close  to one. When  1-  Pa()  is  more than 1-  ), a  $1 change in the
internal penalty will motivate the cost-minimizing  food processor to improve  quality
more than a $1 change in the external penalty. It follows that relatively small changes
in the  internal  penalty are  as effective  in motivating the  processor  to achieve  the
regulator's target quality level as relatively large changes in the external penalty and,
all other things being equal, the same level of quality will be achieved at a lower cost
using the internal penalty rather than the external penalty.
In the next section, we present a numerical example to illustrate the impact of the
internal failure cost on the optimal conformance  rate.
A Numerical Example
In the previous section, we showed that the internal failure cost influences the pro-
cessor's motivation to achieve the target conformance rate under the specific conditions
summarized  in table  1. In this section, we use  a numerical  example to illustrate the
relationship between the target conformance  rate and the internal failure cost and the
interrelationship between the internal and external penalty costs. We assume the pro-
cessor's prevention cost function is exponential and of the form w()) = 0.0001 exp(15()),
making the cost of achieving  100% conformance  about $327 per unit. We also assume
that the sample  size n is  10, the lot size L is  500, and the annual demand )A  for this
product is 100,000 units. Finally, we assume an appraisal cost, p, of $1  per unit. These
values were selected because they represent a case in which the internal penalty cost
is relevant for a broad range of external penalty costs and target conformance rates.
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In table 2, the internal failure costs that motivate the supplier to achieve target
conformance rates of 0.80,  0.85, 0.90, and 0.95 are presented for the three inspection
policies and external failure costs ranging from zero to $1,000 per unit. Second-order
conditions  were  found to hold at the minimum value of s. As one  would  expect,  the
internal failure cost declines  as the external failure  cost increases.  At low levels  of
target conformance rate, the internal failure cost reaches zero quite rapidly, indicating
the external penalty is sufficiently large to motivate the processor to achieve the target,
and making s irrelevant.  In table 3, we present the optimal expected annual costs of the
combinations  of external and internal failure  costs reported in table 2.  In all cases,
the expected  annual cost increases  as the external failure cost increases,  confirming
Proposition  5; i.e.,  the most economically  efficient  combination  of r and s is the one
where  r  = 0,  and s is at the minimum  defined by (7). An important detail should be
noted:  When  the target conformance  rate is relatively  low (e.g.,  0.80  as in the  PR/
HACCP), and the regulator utilizes sampling with c > 0 to inspect the product, there is
no advantage to imposing an internal penalty cost when r is greater than a relatively
low level (about $300 per unit in our example).
Implications for Policy Makers, Regulators,
Management, and Future Research
Implications  for Policy Makers and Regulators
The results of this study can be used as guidelines for evaluating whether or not an
internal penalty is needed to provide additional economic motivation for a processor
to achieve targets for food safety conformance.  Our analysis shows that the internal
penalty cost is not relevant in all cases and, when the internal penalty cost is irrelevant,
it is because the processor is already motivated to achieve 100% conformance or because
the processor will never be motivated to achieve  100%  conformance, regardless  of the
regulator's target.
Our findings can also be used to determine what sort of inspection policies are most
appropriate for motivating a processor  to achieve the regulator's target quality level.
Different inspection policies influence processor behavior in different ways. Under more
rigorous inspection policies (i.e., those having a lower acceptance number c), processors are
motivated to achieve the regulator's target at lower levels of internal penalty. Somewhat
counterintuitively,  we found that the less rigorous inspection policies (i.e., those with the
higher acceptance numbers) have lower annual costs. The reason for this in the numerical
example is that lots are less likely to be accepted under the more rigorous inspection, and
this decline in Pa far outweighs the benefits of a lower internal penalty cost.
Finally, when the internal penalty cost is relevant and the regulator has some control
over the external penalty as well, the most economically  efficient combination of inter-
nal and external penalties includes r = 0, at least for the inspection policies considered
here. There may exist inspection policies (e.g., double or triple inspection with multiple
classes)  for  which this is not the case.  This may imply that the socially optimal
combination of internal and external penalties involves protecting the processor from
external penalties while simultaneously imposing high internal penalties. Further
research may shed more light on this interesting result.
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Table 2.  Minimum Internal Penalty Cost (s)  Required to Motivate a Food
Processor to Deliver the Target Conformance  Rate Under Three Different
Inspection Policies
External Penalty  Target Conformance Rate (4t)
Cost ($/unit)  0.80  0.85  0.90  0.95













































Minimum Value of s for Inspection Policy c =  1 ($/unit)
14.09  42.00  134.92  554.60
9.50  34.10  121.22  527.18
4.92  26.21  107.51  499.77
0.34  18.32  93.80  472.35
0.00  10.43  80.10  444.94
0.00  2.53  66.39  417.52
0.00  0.00  52.69  390.11
0.00  0.00  38.98  362.69
0.00  0.00  25.27  335.28
0.00  0.00  11.57  307.86
0.00  0.00  0.00  280.45
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Table 3. Expected Annual Cost at the Minimum Value of s Required to Moti-
vate a Food Processor to Deliver the Target Conformance Rate Under Three
Different Inspection Policies
External Penalty  Target Conformance Rate ()t)
Cost ($/unit)  0.80  0.85  0.90  0.95
Expected Annual Cost at
























_  _  _  _ _
.87  21.37  25.69  30.19
.13  22.17  26.10  30.31
.39  22.97  26.50  30.42
.65  23.77  26.91  30.54
.02  24.57  27.31  30.66
.98  25.37  27.72  30.77
.94  26.33  28.12  30.89
.90  27.80  28.53  31.01
.86  29.27  28.93  31.12
.82  30.74  29.75  31.24
.78  32.21  30.73  31.36
Expected Annual Cost at
Minimum Value of s for Inspection Policy c = 1 ($ mil.)
;.68  9.85  14.75  22.1
'.87  10.66  15.24  22.3
.07  11.47  15.73  22.5
.27  12.28  16.21  22.8
.18  13.09  16.70  23.0
.14  13.90  17.19  23.2
.10  15.15  17.68  23.5:
.06  16.62  18.17  23.7,
.02  18.09  18.66  23.9;
.98  19.56  19.15  24.2
.94  21.03  19.71  24.4,
Expected Annual Cost at
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Implications  for Management
There are two ways in which food processing firm managers may be able to use the
results of this research. First, firms subject to government inspection can use the results
to lobby for internal penaenlty costs and inspection policies which achieve the regulator's
objectives for food safety at the lowest possible expected cost. Not surprisingly, the
processor's lowest expected cost occurs when the inspection  policy is less rigorous and
the external penalty cost is lowest. Our findings suggest that a less rigorous inspection
policy and a low penalty cost can be combined with an internal penalty to achieve the
same level of conformance  by the processor. These results can also be used to reveal
when internal penalties are unnecessary as additional motivation.
Second, firms using inspection procedures to monitor the quality of incoming raw
materials, ingredients, or components  can apply the results of this analysis to their
procurement policies. Unlike government regulators, firms have more control  over
the external penalty and less control  over  the internal penalty they levy against
suppliers delivering low-quality or unsafe product. With only minor modification, the
results of this analysis can be used to identify the lowest level of external penalty
needed to motivate  a supplier  to deliver a product with the required specifications
under an established inspection plan. Information  of this nature can be invaluable
to firms negotiating supplier contracts.
Implications  for Future  Research
One  of the major weaknesses of this analysis is the assumption that the prevention
function is well known and understood. This will only be the case in systems that are
well understood  by their managers, i.e.,  very simple systems, or systems which have
been formally and thoroughly studied. There is a substantial literature devoted  to
experimental  design  for the  purposes  of understanding  the relationship  between
manufacturing system inputs and outputs. While the emphasis in economics  has long
been on the quantity output (i.e., production functions), the emphasis in operations
management has been on the quality output for at least the last decade (e.g., see Moen,
Nolan, and Provost). There appears to be considerable opportunity for applying these
methods to the special problems  of biologically based production systems.
Another shortcoming of this study is the reliance on a meaningful definition of the
external penalty cost. Substantial research has been directed toward exploring the
costs and benefits to society of lapses in food safety associated with the incidence of
certain types  of food poisoning.  However, little research has been directed toward
determining the full cost to a firm of such events.  A full measurement  of this cost
would include costs associated with loss of goodwill, reputation, and trust with the
food supply chain, deterioration in stock price and firm value, and punitive damages
levied by the courts (where the records may be sealed). Not only is the dollar value
of this cost difficult to measure,  but the probability that the cost is incurred  is not
completely documented or understood.
[Received September 1999; final revision received March 2000.]
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Appendix:
Partial Derivatives  of
Pa(¢)  and w(4)
The probability that a lot is accepted under a single-sample inspection policy with constant probability
of conformance is
(Al)  P  d=O  df  - )d
d=0




(A3)  UP,,  E  I (n - d)(n  - d - 1)  2d(n - d)  + d(d  - 1) lI  rrr  no (  _  <t>4-n-d (A3)  Pn2  =  E  dl)  - 2  nd)  d(d  d  (1-)dnd
d=O  l  2  ((1 - ))  (1  - d  d  (
When c = 0, these equations simplify to the following:
(A4)  Pa  = b,
(A5)  Pa  = nn- l,
and
(A6)  P'"  = n(n - 1)4t-
2
We  consider two  prevention cost functions  in this analysis:  linear and exponential.  For a linear
function defined as w(=) = a + bw, the first and second derivatives are obviously w' = b and w" = 0. For
an exponential function defined as  w(()  = a exp(p4), the first derivative is w' = pa exp(p,), or simply
w'  = pw. Similarly, the second derivative for an exponential prevention cost function is w" = p
2a exp(p(),
or simply w" = p
2w.
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